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In Roman Catholic moral the-
ology, it has always been held 
t hat one can make an adequately 
moral decision only when all the 
reasonably available pertinent in-
formation is in hand. With regard 
to the moral problems of procrea-
tion, Pope Paul VI has adopted 
the phrase " responsible parent-
hood," and noted t.hat. a variety 
of circumstances may lead re-
sponsible parents "to avoid for 
the time being, or even for an in-
determinate period, a new birth.'" 
The notion of genetic respon-
sibility has taken on great signifi-
cance in recent years.2 In the 
past, parents have of course al· 
ways hoped that their children 
would be born healthy; they have 
struggled, sometimes heriocally, 
to care for children during illness 
or th rough infirmity. But only 
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recently has the possibility of de-
termining ahead 0/ time the ge· 
netic well-being of children be-
come a reali ty. 
Genetic counseling can pro-
vide, fo r many people, precise 
information about genetic disease 
in children a lready born, about 
t he risk of recurrence, about 
prognosis, and e.,en about the 
genetic status of a fetus in the 
womb. This kind of information 
has helped transform procreation 
into an activity subject to more 
deliberate choices than used to 
be the case. 
It is to be expected that so-
ciety, both secular and eccIesial, 
will increasingly consider that ma-
ture persons should demonstrate 
active responsibility with respect 
to the genetic health of their 
prospective children.] We already 
look fo r this in terms of such 
things as provision of a place to 
live, financial resources to insure 
adequate food, clothing, educa-
tion, etc. 
For purposes of this discussion, 
concern for genetic well-being of 
as-yet-unborn persons is eugenics. 
It is important to distinguish two 
types of eugenics. Positive eu-
genics is the systematic attempt 
to increase desirable hereditary 
traits. Negative eugenics is the 
systematic attempt to decrease 
undesirable hereditary t r a i ts. 
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Eugenic programs are societal 
structures designed to change the 
genetic heritage of whole popu-
lat ions. Eugenic decisions are 
made by individual families (one 
husband and one wire) concern-
ing the genetic heritage and stat-
us of their own present and/ or 
prospective ch ild (ren). 
One can isolate at least thir-
teen major ethical issues which 
obtain in genetic counseling (Ta-
ble l). ~ Some issues pertain ex-
clusively to those who run the 
genetics clinic, while others con-
cern the family which comes for 
genetic counseling. In this essay, 
I propose to explore the dimen-
sions of parental genetic respon-
sibility and the considerations 
which enter their genetic deci-
sion-making. 
Table ] 
Ethical issues in human genetics 
1) informed consent for experi-
mentation 
2) parental responsibility for 
genetic health (a priori) 
3) parental responsibility for 
nurture of the defective chi ld 
(a posteriori) 
4) privacy of information vis-a-
uis at-risk relatives 
5) privacy of information vis-a-
uis society at large 
6) methods of family plan im-
plementation 
7) abortion 
B) methods of weighing factors 
in decision-making 
9) eugenic concerns 
10) qualifications of a genetic 
counselor 
November, 1976 
11) structure of genetic counsel-
ing (clinic) 
12) provision/ withholding of in-
formation to/ from counselee 
13) quality of participation in 
the process of decision-mak-
ing. 
It should be explicated here 
that my concern is exclusively 
with negative eugenic decisions. 
There is virtually unanimous 
agreement that eugenic programs, 
whether positive or negative, do 
not yet offer sufficient promise 
to warrant the compromising of 
human freedoms which they 
would inevitably entai l. Further-
more, positive eugenic decisions 
(with the exception of deliberate 
assortative mating) are not at 
this time possible except as ex-
perimental procedures. As such, 
they entail unquantified risks 
which may constitute a strong 
argument against their accept-
ability} While the s e deserve 
attention, they are of less im-
mediate urgency than are nega-
tive eugenic decisions, which for 
a long time will continue to oc-
cupy most of the energies ex-
pended in and around genetics 
clinics. Positive eugenic decisions, 
in any case, can be subjected to 
an ethical dissection very s imilar 
to the one applied here to nega-
tive eugenic decisions. 
I undertake this discussion 
with c e r t a i n presuppositions. 
First, I assume that parents have 
a strong desire to act responsibly 
in this matter, and that they are 
of average intelligence and edu-
cation .6 Second, I assume that 
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the increasing publicity about ge-
netic counseling has reached 
them, whet.her through the mass 
media or the agency of family 
physicians, clergy, relatives 01' 
friends. (If t hey are unaware of 
the availability and applicability 
of genetic counseling, they can-
not be expected to seek it.) 
Third, I assume that genetic 
counselors adhere to the strictest 
discipline of non-directive coun-
seling, seeking a I wa y s to be 
helpers, in fonners, supporters, 
encouragers for the family, bu t 
always insisting t ha t the family 
must make its own decision (s) J 
Fourth, I assume that the genetic 
condit ion about which a decision 
is to be made is one that poses a 
serious burden of suffering to the 
family (i.e., a non- trivial nega tive 
eugenic decision ). 
To Whom Responsible? 
We cannot impute moral re-
sponsibility to a person in a 
vacuum; we must make it clear 
to whom (s) he is answerable for 
actions. Table II lists (in roughly 
descending order of weight) those 
dimensions of responsibili ty which 
can be identified for genetic de-
cision-making. 
Table II 
Dimensions of genetic 
responsibility· 
1) between spouses 
2) parents to child (ren) a pos-
teriori 
3) parents to child(ren) a priori 
4) genetic counselee(s ) to rela-
tive(s) at risk 
5) spouses to society at large 
6) spouses to pos terity a t large 
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7) genetic counselee (s ) to ge-
netic counselor (s) 
· spouses - parents - genetic 
counselees = decision-makers 
1) Between spouses. Most peo-
ple never have any reason to sus-
pect that they may have or ca r-
ry a genetic disease posing a 
threat to prospective children. 
(Choice of a spouse may involve, 
to be sure, a more or less con-
scious posilive eugenic considera-
tion.) But occasionally one's 
family or personal health history 
reveals a heredita ry problem. In 
such cases, it is a matter of basic 
honesty that this be disclosed to 
one's prospective spouse. 1 t is 
simply an element in t he mutual 
self-revelat ion that is part of the 
speciaUy intense human relation-
ship of marriage. I have argued 
elsewhere t hat deliberate con-
cealment of such information 
probably constitutes grounds for 
annulment of marriage even with-
in the strict canonical discipline 
of the Roman Catholic Church:" 
Whether the genetic bad news 
an tedates marriage or enters as 
an unpleasant surprise wi th the 
birth of an affected child, spouses 
are responsible to one another for 
an adequate approach to the 
necessary subsequent decision-
making. It is not sufficient for 
one to acquiesce silently to the 
other's reproductive inclinations. 
To do so would compromise the 
mu tuality of decision-making 
which is essential in the marriage 
relationship. A one-sided decision 
in matters of genetics can set the 
stage for major problems in the 
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future , especially if the conse-
quences of the ill-made choice in-
clude birth of a seriously affected 
child.9 
2) Parents to child(ren) a pos-
teriori. Extant children, whether 
or not they are suffering from the 
disease in question, have a claim 
on their parents to reach genetic 
d ec i s ion s carefully. The child 
(ren) must s har e the conse-
quences of these decisions. 
3) Parents to child( rerz) a 
p r io r i. Over 2000 hereditary 
health problems are now known. tO 
Their severity ranges from com-
plete triviality to tremendous 
burdens of protracted suffering. 
Depending on the severity of the 
condition in question, parents 
will need to take account of the 
risk of suffering to which they 
may expose the prospective child-
(ren) whose conception is being 
contemplated. The quality of life 
reasonably foreseeable should be 
considered. A ch ild who suffers 
later, from a preventable condi: 
tion, may accuse his or her par-
ents of negligence. On the other 
hand, if the choice is lire with 
suffering as opposed to non-exist-
ence, the child's case may be dif-
ficu lt to argue. 
4) Genetic counselee(s) to rel-
atives at risk. Most genetic COlln-
s e lor s and commen tators on 
medical ethics agree that a per-
son found to have or carry a seri-
ous genetic disease ought to allow 
his or her physician to inform 
any relatives who may also be at 
risk of suffering the condition 
themselves or in their children. It 
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has been argued that this is a 
threat to privacy or may lead to 
social or familial stigmatization. II 
But if adequate counseling is pro-
vided to all involved, it should be 
possible to main tain a balanced 
understanding of the problem 
and its implications. There is a 
significant moral obligation rest -
ing on a per so n who holds 
imp o r ta n t information about 
someone else to reveal that in-
formation in order to provide 
that person at least the opportu-
nity of using it in his or her own 
life decisions.I J 
5) Spouses to society at large. 
The relationship of a family to 
society at large is complex. Each 
makes certain demands of the 
other. But society is not a single 
monolithic entity, much less a 
person. 1l A family will not relate 
to its society as it does to its 
friends, relatives, neighbors or 
colleagues. I ts sense of respon-
sibility to society takes the shape 
of an active desire to playa con-
structive role in t he wide sweep of 
human progress. There will be 
concern to avoid demanding of 
its city, state, or nation any as-
sistance which it can reasonably 
provide fo r itself. 
In turn , the people who make 
up society, and who contribute to 
whatever common fund may be 
available for special needs, have 
legitimate claim on the individual 
family to actively avoid unneces-
sary withdrawals: 
6) Spous es to posterity at 
large. Prospective grandchildren 
may be at risk of suffering or 
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gaining by genetic decisions. So 
might prospective great-grand-
children. There is some virtue in 
recognizing that any really im-
portant decision made by me in 
1976 may have repercussions not 
only in the 1980's, but also dur-
ing t he 2080's. 
I have argued elsewhere, u at 
some length, that the legitimate 
place fo r large eugenic concerns 
in the genetic decision-making 
process is the place freely given 
to them by the decision-makers: 
t he (prospective ) parents. If a 
eugenic counselor has personal 
eugenic views, (s)he will act re-
sponsibly to keep these from be-
ing an obstacle to the counselees. 
since it is to the latter that the 
decision falls as an act of a moral 
agent. Nor should a society that 
claims to be democratic, and to 
hold freedom of self·detennina-
t ion as a prime value, contem-
plate any legislative interference 
in this decisional process. To do 
so would be not only a compro-
mise of t he moral process (de-
cision-agency, which can reside 
only in a person or a family but 
not in a state ) , but also a be· 
trayal of stated secular values. 
Calculating genetic responsi-
bility to posterity many genera-
tions removed is perhaps an 
empty theoretical exercise. But 
it is reasonable to expect that the 
persons of the 23rd century, in 
examining history, will hold us 
responsible for having opened or 
closed our eyes to t he challenges 
and possibilities of the 20th. 
7) Genetic counseLee{s} to ge-
netic cou1l$elor{s} . It is of course 
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important that genetic counselees 
and genetic counselors establish 
a good working relationship if 
their encounter is to make a posi-
tive contribu tion to the difficult 
process of genetic decision-mak. 
ing. Primarily, the counselor 
team is cast in roles of service. 
But it should be obvious that the 
counselees will receive help only 
to the extent that t hey are open 
to it. This calls fo r a) providing 
diagnosticians and counselors 
with adequate answers to their 
questions, and b) making the 
best effort to "hear" what is be-
ing offered them in the counsel-
ing sessions, even though the 
news may be unwelcome. 
How to Reach a Decision 
It is hopefully clear that the 
seven persons and groups of per-
sons discussed above do not have 
equ.al claim on the attention and 
moral agency of genetic decision-
makers. Listing t he elements to 
be considered in reaching these 
decisions, I likewise do not wish 
to imply equal gravity. At least 
ten such elements can be recog-
nized in dissecting the complex 
dynamics of genetic decision-
making process (Table 111 ) .15 
Table III 
Considerations in parental 
genetic decision·making 
1) own capacities for care, fo r 
suffering 
2) status of marital relationship 
3) impact on extant child (ren) 
4) foreseeable suffering of pros-
pective child (ren) 
5) financial capacities 
6) reproductive options 
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7) moral commitments and con-
flicts 
B) burden to society for sup-
port 
9) eugenic considerations 
10) reasons fo r technological op-
timism 
1) Own capacities. People who 
have given birt.h to a child with 
some unexpected deleterious ge-
netic condition often suffer feel-
ings of "cosmic guilt." '~ They 
may undergo severe strains of 
doubts about themselves and 
their own goodness as persons. 
This kind of shock-reaction may 
last fo r days, weeks, or months, 
and may be further complicated 
by an understandable sense of 
loss and appropriate grief reac-
tion. ( In a sense, they have lost 
the healthy child whose birth 
had been anticipated.) Genetic 
decisions un d e r such circum-
stances are difficult if not im-
possi ble. 
A good counselor will help 
them through t his period to a 
time when they can ra tionally 
take stock of t hemselves in terms 
of their capacity, as persons, to 
care for an (other) affected child. 
Foreseeing one's stamina in the 
face of suffering is notoriously 
difficult, but it should be obvious 
that self-evaluation must be part 
of an adequate decision process. 
2) Marital relationship. I have 
noted above that spouses are re-
sponsible to each other for self-
disclosure in the matter of serious 
genetic health problems and/ or 
risks to offspring, and for mutu-
ali ty in entering the genetic deci-
sion process. I t can further be 
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observed t hat a couple experienc-
ing marital stress should never 
initiate a pregnancy, genetic risks 
aside. Responsible persons will 
wait until such storms resolve, 
and then include the quality of 
their ever-unfinished relationship 
among the factors pertinent to 
undertaking the risks of procrea-
tionY 
3) Extant child(ren). There 
are two kinds of extant children 
in a family faced with a genetic 
decision. 
a) There may be genetically 
"healthy" children (at least, un-
affected by the condition in ques-
tion ). If t hey are already living 
with a handicapped sibling, it 
may be seen as an undue burden 
on them to risk another's birth. 
On t he other hand, the experi-
ence of dealing with the special 
problems of living with an affect.-
ed person may be seen as a posi-
tive element in their education as 
sensitive persons. They may also 
perceive parental activity in de-
liberately choosing at least one 
major aspect of children's genetic 
makeup as an indirect affirma-
tion of t hemselves (that their 
parents chose and value t hem as 
they are) . Or they might perceive 
this as a threat (that they could 
have been judged inadequate, 
never brought to life, or selective-
ly aborted). I am not aware of 
any research having been done to 
quantify these poten tial hazards 
and benefits. 
b) If the genetic condition in 
question first came to attention 
with the birt h of an affected child 
(as opposed to having been as-
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certained prior to any procrea-
tion), that child may be living 
during and after genetic deci-
sions. All the same considerations 
apply here as were mentioned for 
"normal" children, except that 
for this child the possible feelings 
of affirmation or rejection may be 
amplified due to recognition of 
self as being at the center of the 
crisis and its sequelae. 
Furthermore, the prognosis for 
the extant aHected child will be 
a factor in decision-making. Does 
t he foreseeable burden of man-
agement obviate the human pos-
sibility of caring for another such 
child ... or even of an additional 
healthy child? 
Finally, some of the genetic de-
cisions parents face focus not pri -
marily on further procreation, 
but on the extant affected child. 
Based on the natural history of 
a known condition (as explained 
to them by genetic counselors), 
parents will have to make choices 
am 0 n g management options, 
which may include a lmost any 
imaginable combination of the 
foliowing;1 8 ordinary tender lov-
ing care, repeated medical follow-
up visits, special dietary regimen, 
medications, special education, 
t herapy, prosthesis, surgery, res-
pite ca re, adopt ion out of the 
family, institutionalization, epal-
lobiosis,19 enthetobiosis,19 heroic 
experiments,2o allowing the child 
to die by withholding all but 
minimal care.21 
4) Foreseeable suffe r ing of 
prospective child(ren}. Some par-
ents will consider the burden of, 
for example, hemophilia too great 
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to tolerate giving birth to a son 
when they know themselves to be 
at risk. Others will think that 
current therapy for the type of 
hemophilia they face is adequate 
fo r them to expect a reasonably 
normal, happy and productive life 
fo r their child. These two fami lies 
will make different decisions, but 
the need to assess the foreseeable 
burden to the prospective child is 
obvious.22 
Burden calculus may depend 
largely on the quality of counsel-
ing provided to the family. In 
conditions for which prenatal di-
agnosis does not apply, or for 
families who completely reject 
'selective abortion as a means of 
avoiding birth of an a ffected 
child, the recurrence risk will be 
an important factor in decision. 
Not many people would look 
quietly upon a 50% risk for a 
major disease, but some would be 
comfortable with a 25% risk. 
Others would avoid procreation 
because of a 5% risk, even for a 
condi tion which an outside ob-
server thinks to be relatively mi-
nor. Et cetera. 
Not every genetic problem is 
necessarily always to be shunned. 
It is impossible to conclude that 
giving birth to a child with, for 
example, the Down syndrome, is 
per se a moral evil; "normality" 
is "better," but persons with this 
condition are not unmitigated de-
fects to family and society.2l 
The possibility of experimental 
procedures may enter here. Par-
ents' informed consent is a deli-
cate matter. Assuming it can be 
adequately infonned, that con-
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sent may be appropriate to at-
tempt novel approaches to pre-
vention , treatment, etc. 
5) Financial capacities. It is 
an unfort unate anomaly in our 
society that we affirm freedom of 
self-detennination in matters like 
genetic decision-making, but fail 
to follow through with uncondi-
tional commitment to help bear 
the weight of management in 
health crises. This is true even fo r 
situations in which there was no 
opportuni ty to anticipate the 
problem. As a society, we are in 
need of a radical conversion to 
mut.ual support in ca tastrophic 
health problems. Until such a 
commitment is made, t he spectre 
of bankruptcy haunts those mak-
ing genetic decisions.!1 
6) Reproductive options. As-
suming, with Pope Paul VI , tha t 
responsib le parents deliberately 
choose the number and spacing 
of thei r children , one should ex-
pect that genetic counseling may 
further their understanding of 
the reproductive opt ions avail-
able and appl icable to effect their 
genetic decisions. These include, 
of course: periodic abstinence 
from intercourse, cont raceptive 
devices and chemicals, steriliza-
tion, by various means, of one 
part.ner, artificial insemination by 
husband or donor, prenatal di-
agnosis and selective abortion ,: ' 
adop tion, experimenta l proce-
dures (e.g. embryo implanta-
t ion), divorce, and the status 
quo. 
The las t.-mentioned is impor-
ta nt. Some famili es will decide to 
make no changes in their previ-
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ous family plans. When I go to 
such lengths to delineate the di-
mensions and considera tions of 
parental genetic responsibility, I 
do not assume that responding to 
new infonnation necessarily leads 
to any concrete changes in pro-
creative plans. I in tend only to 
urge t hat there exists a moral 
obligation to respond actively 
and make decisions deliberately. 
Thus, I do not think it will ever 
be considered "responsible" for 
parents to consciously avoid ac-
quisition and implementation of 
avaiJable information pertinent to 
the health of their prospective 
children/Ii provided of course 
that this information includes 
some options and is noL simply 
an imposition of additional ten-
sion. 
7) Moral commitments and 
conflicts. People have moral com-
mitments. They have cherished 
notions of wha t is right and what. 
is wrong. Often, these are only 
partiall y explicit. Often, they are 
part of larger personal dedica-
t iom; to religious systems of be-
lief. Unfortunately, genetic deci-
sions often present parents wi th 
a direct confl ict. of two or more 
deeply cherished va lues. This 
may plunge them int.o what has 
been called "moral su ffering."21 
Support and encouragement by 
clergy, physicians, or othe~ who 
share the parents' moral atti t udes 
can be a creative service. Deci-
sion-making seen in li ght of moral 
suffering is evident. ly a profound 
challenge to the moral agen t. One 
can hope t hat people who enter 
such a struggle wit.h generosity 
287 
and courage will emerge victori-
ous at least in the sense that they 
will have grown together as per-
sons and as a family. But to say 
this is not in any way to suggest 
that they will not be in pain, as 
they weigh genetic facts against 
conflicting values. Cursory in-
spection of the management and 
reproductive options listed above 
will provide a host of immediate-
ly obvious conflicts that may 
arise in the minds and hearts of 
conscientious, highly motivated 
(prospective) parents. 
8 ) Bu.rden to society. Parents 
will sometimes fa ll back on so-
cietal resources to help them cope 
with the problems of caring fo r an 
affected child. The other side of 
this coin, of course, is that they 
should consider their neighbors' 
potential sacrifices in this rega rd. 
This is not to extenuate societal 
responsibility to provide such 
help (as noted ahove). But it is 
importan t that the individual 
family disdain to perceive societal 
structures of support as guaran-
teed cushions on which to rest 
while abrogating responsibil ity to 
reach difficult decisions fo r them-
selves.2R 
9) Eugenic decisions and fu-
ture generations at large. Earlier 
I asserted that what we know 
about human genetics and the 
potential problems or hopes in 
eugenic programs is insufficiently 
compelling to justify compromis-
ing the val u e s of freedom of 
self-determination in genetic de-
cision-making. This does not re-
move eugenic concern in the wide 
population sense from the list of 
288 
legitimate considerations in the 
minds of parents.29 Like family 
size limitation partially motivat-
ed by environmental concern and 
a sense of responsibility for popu-
lation size limitation, eugenic 
decisions may well rest in part on 
an awareness of the possible wide 
repercussions of an indjvidual's 
procreative decisions. 
To reiterate, hmvever, the 
place for this kind of eugenic con-
cem is only the place given it by 
the genetic counselees. So long 
as their freedom of choice re-
mains unimpaired by intrusive 
legislation, no counselor is jus ti-
fied in imposing a eugenic pro-
gram. l O To do so is to betray the 
trust on which counseling rela-
tionships must be founded. 
10) An element of hope. Nai-
vete and despair are extreme po-
sitions, and as such are both de-
plorable.31 Insofar as is possible, 
persons who serve as genetic, 
rel igious or other types of coun-
selors should lead the expec ta-
tions of their patien ts / clients! 
counselees into a rea listic middle 
ground. For some genetic condi-
tions, wonderful advances have 
already been made. For others, it 
is realistic to hold a certain 
amount of technological opti-
mism. Others threaten to remain 
intractable for a long lime, if 
not indefinitely. Responsible par-
ents/ decision-makers will try to 
assess the appropriateness of 
hope in new developments as a 
consideration in their dedding. 
As has been mentioned above, 
however, th is docs not exonerate 
willful ignorance in situations 
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where available information could 
make a concrete difference in the 
genetic well-being of children. 
Conclusion 
The reader will have discerned 
that this treatment of the dimen-
sions of and considera tions in ge-
netic decision-making has been 
decidedly shallow. Each of the 
seventeen aspects presented de-
serves considerable expansion and 
analysis. My purpose, however, 
has been to expose the breadth of 
the question of parental genetic 
responsibility. I hope to have pro-
vided an adequate framework 
within which others can join in 
the pursuit of these important 
matters in grea ter detail. 
1 would like to observe, in con-
cluding, that there exist impor-
tant differences between moral 
obligations and ethical re fJections 
on t he one hand, and legal sanc-
tions on the other. Legality and 
ethicality are by no means co-
terminous. I propose that we 
impute moral obligations to pros-
pective parents, and anticipate 
social and ecclesial atmospheres 
of opinion in which people in-
creasingly ex p e c t active re-
sponsibility-taking for g e net i c 
well-being of offspring. But this 
should be tempered by a sincere 
concern for persons who are faced 
with t he exceedingly painful and 
complex decisions which arise in 
this area . I would not wish to be 
perceived as a fashioner of new 
burdens for others to carry. 
Rather, I would insist that all of 
us have an obligation to protect 
the moral agent from any kind of 
short-circui ting of the decisional 
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process. Therefore, any legisla-
tive intervention or other coercive 
measures compromising t hat 
process are vehemently to be 
opposed.J2 
There are and will be cases in 
which conflicts of opinion arise 
between a family and its physi-
cians; it can be appropriate to 
appeal to court-appoin ted arbi-
trat.ing, presumably dispassion-
ate, third parties. JJ Finally, be-
cause they are decidedly excep-
tional,H those parents whose pro-
creative behavior is grossly irre-
sponsible, to the extent of per-
haps necessitating public inter-
vention, have not been consid-
ered here. There are ample prece-
dents for court intervention in 
par a II e I child-rearing circum-
stances, and it does not seem 
likely to me that future judg-
ments should stray far from 
these. 
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Aesculapius and Zadok: 
Medical and Priestly Authority 
John F. X. Sheehan, S.J . 
Father Sheehart has been a 
member of the Marquette Uni -
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since 1970 and has served as its 
chairman since 1972. 
The author of a number oj ar-
ticles and reviews, he has written 
three books and a fourth is 
scheduled for publication by the 
Paulist Press in January, 1977. 
Physicians and priests have 
much in common. Friends and 
detractors of each group have 
generally been in agreement on 
that. Those who find physicians 
to be a beneficent lot, generaUy 
thin k well of priests; those who 
are "turned off' by physicians 
and find them aloof and arrogant, 
often entertain dark thoughts 
aboul the priestly caste. 
Detractors have noted traits 
common to the two groups. Each 
- at least sometimes - wears 
special garb; each seems a trifle 
overconcerned with being ad-
dressed by proper title; each 
caste, no matter how narrow its 
education may be, offers to its 
members at least a special tech-
r..ical vocabulary which seems -
to t he hostile - designed to baf-
fle the outsider. 
292 
Perhaps one further common 
denominator is found between 
the hard-working priest outside 
academe and the harried physi-
cian in practice. Neither of them 
has opportunity to do much re-
flecting on the nature of his pro-
fessional life. There is too much 
to be done to waste time think-
ing about it! 
Others have more leisure. A 
fairly recent book , t he work of a 
medical socio logist and a research 
physician , offers an unusual op-
port uni ty for reflection. ( Models 
0/ Madness. Models 0/ Medicine: 
Siegler and Osmond, MacMillan, 
1974 ). In the major insight that 
interests us, the two authors lean 
heavi ly on an unpubl ished manu-
script by T. T . Paterson. The 
results of tbat study may be 
properly rephrased as follows: 
medical authority derives from 
three sources; some of it is moral; 
some of it is sapientiai; what re-
ma ins, the most important part, 
is simply Aesculapian. This last 
is not simply charismatic. It does 
not flow from personality. But it 
is not precisely sapientiai or mor-
al. No government confers it with 
a li cense. (A non-licensed med i-
cal student may be possessed of 
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